Crown vs Star Casino 2026 Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Brisbane Compared

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This is separate from venue-based exclusion programs for pubs, clubs, and casinos. Registration is free and blocks you for a minimum of three months up to a lifetime. To self-exclude from all licensed Australian online and phone betting services, you must register with BetStop, the National Self-Exclusion Register.
The overall corporate entity avoided formal voluntary administration after Bally’s Corporation agreed to acquire a 56.7% controlling stake in April 2025. The Star’s casino properties in Sydney and the Gold Coast remained open throughout the crisis. For Australians who regularly visited Star’s properties or who are now navigating an uncertain transition period, the question of where to play is a practical one. The combination of shrinking revenue, soaring compliance costs, mounting regulatory fines, and a debt structure that gave little room for manoeuvre left Star unable to fund itself.
This is prohibited by the federal Interactive Gambling Act 2001, and these sites offer no consumer protection. what is a pokie in australia you can expect from a licensed site’s offers in Queensland. Verify with the local regulator and your ad-platform account manager before launching. Programmatic networks must enforce distance buffers around school properties and youth centers. Commercial runs are legal but heavily restricted by ACMA standards. Native architectures must integrate robust geo-tracking software to respect federal land exclusions. Unlicensed sites may take deposits but offer no consumer protection if a payout dispute arises.
Star’s loyalty programme remained active through the Bally’s acquisition process. AUSTRAC was seeking a penalty of up to AU$400 million; Star argued any penalty above AU$100 million would push it into insolvency. For online gambling, Australians may legally use platforms licensed and regulated in their jurisdiction for sports betting and racing. Australians seeking online gambling options should verify the legal status of any operator before registering. When the Oaktree Capital rescue deal stalled over the NSW government’s refusal to grant rights over the Star Sydney land, the company’s options narrowed rapidly — until Bally’s stepped in. In the 2023–24 financial year, Star recorded AU$1.69 billion in losses, including a AU$1.44 billion write-down on casino assets.
Investigators found major failings in AML controls, VIP oversight, and corporate governance. The Star Sydney has remained under external supervision and government oversight — a status expected to continue through at least September 2025. Star Casino regulatory action in both NSW and Queensland was triggered by concurrent inquiries that exposed deep systemic failures. The findings were damning, and the penalties were substantial, though licence suspensions were repeatedly deferred to give the company time to remediate. With its $15M NICC fine instalment obligations, mounting legal costs, and a pending AUSTRAC penalty potentially reaching AU$400 million, the arithmetic was brutal. By the final quarter of 2024, the company was spending AU$107 million in a single three-month period while only holding AU$79 million in the bank. Mandatory carded play requirements, introduced as part of post-inquiry reforms, reduced the casino floor’s appeal to certain segments of players.
Both states maintained regulatory oversight rather than forcing immediate closure. In Queensland, Star was fined AU$100 million and faced a 90-day licence suspension that was repeatedly deferred pending remediation. In NSW, The Star Sydney’s licence was suspended following both the 2022 and 2024 Bell Inquiry findings of unsuitability. The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) actively blocks unlicensed offshore casino sites. It is important to note that under Australia’s Interactive Gambling Act 2001, offshore online casino sites are prohibited from offering services to Australian residents.
The AU$3.6 billion Queen’s Wharf Brisbane development, while ambitious, had added to the company’s financing obligations. At the heart of Star’s downfall was a culture that prioritised revenue — particularly from high-rolling VIP and junket operators — over compliance with Australia’s strict anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing laws. Regulatory failures, a crippling debt load, the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and intensifying competition all played roles. Players who had not redeemed accumulated points by the time any formal programme changes were announced may have seen their value adjusted or transferred to a successor scheme. Players with outstanding credits were encouraged to contact Star directly if they held balances at the time of the crisis. For players with tournament buy-in credits, promotional balances, or funds lodged in electronic gaming accounts, the situation was less clear-cut. Unlike regulated online gambling in some jurisdictions, Australian land-based casinos do not typically hold large pools of ring-fenced player funds.
Throughout the process, independent external managers appointed by NSW and Queensland regulators — principally Nicholas Weeks — continued to oversee casino-level operations, ensuring regulatory continuity even as the corporate structure was in flux. Each enforcement action brought fresh expenses — external managers, legal teams, remediation programmes, and regulatory fines all had to be funded from an operating business that was simultaneously seeing its revenue decline. For players, this should mean operational continuity, though the company’s ongoing regulatory obligations in NSW and Queensland — and the pending AUSTRAC penalty decision — mean the path to full stability is not yet complete. During the crisis, Star continued to honour existing redemptions, and the programme remained active through the transition to Bally’s ownership. The NICC appointed external manager Nicholas Weeks to oversee operations while Star worked toward suitability.